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ABSTRACT 
We investigate the effect of information transparency on the competitive environment by 
examining whether information transparency at the industry level is associated with industry-level 
earnings persistence. Theory predicts that competition reduces the sustainability of abnormally 
high and abnormally low profits, thereby reducing overall earnings persistence. Therefore, if 
information transparency facilitates competition, we expect more transparent industries to have 
lower earnings persistence. We measure industry-level information transparency as the industry-
level future earnings response coefficient. Consistent with our expectation, we find that 
transparency is associated with lower earnings persistence. This finding suggests that information 
transparency facilitates the competitive forces that lead profits to converge within an industry. We 
corroborate this interpretation by demonstrating that information transparency is positively 
associated with the degree to which competitors enter or exit an industry in anticipation of changes 
in the industry’s profitability outlook. Our study provides new and important evidence that 
information transparency facilitates product market competition. 
 
Keywords: Information Transparency; Profitability Convergence; Earnings Persistence; Product 
Market Competition; Abnormal Profits  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In a competitive market, firms with abnormally high profits attract entry by other firms that 
offer similar products at lower prices until abnormally high profits are eroded. Meanwhile, firms 
with abnormally low profits adapt, are acquired by their competitors, or are driven from the market. 
Thus, the competitive process contributes to a lower persistence of both abnormally high and 
abnormally low profits and, consequently, a lower overall persistence of earnings. We use this 
framework to investigate the effect of information transparency on the competitive environment 
by examining whether information transparency at the industry level is associated with industry-
level earnings persistence. If information transparency facilitates competition then earnings 
persistence should be lower in more transparent industries. 
Our study is related to prior research on why abnormal profits persist despite the theorized 
effects of competition (Brozen 1971; Qualls 1974; Mueller 1977; Mueller 1986; Jacobsen 1988; 
Mueller 1990; Waring 1996McGahan and Porter 1997; McGahan and Porter 1999; Roberts 1999; 
Roberts and Dowling 2002; McGahan and Porter 2003). Prior empirical work has documented 
various forms of barriers to entry to explain why abnormal profits persist but has not focused on 
the role of information transparency (Bain 1951; Bain 1956; Williamson 1963; Mann 1966; Brozen 
1971; Qualls 1974; Mueller 1977; Mueller 1986; Mueller 1990; Waring 1996; Roberts 1999; 
Carlton 2004; McAfee, Mialon, Williams 2004; Roberts and Dowling 2002). Our focus on 
information transparency is based on the knowledge that agents require information in order to 
take the competitive actions that ultimately erode abnormal profits. We therefore argue that the 
better the information incumbents and potential entrants have about the economic performance of 
firms in an industry, the better able they are to compete. Despite the theorized importance of 
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transparency in promoting competition, prior research has not explored the impact of transparency 
on the competitive environment.  
We capture information transparency using the future earnings response coefficient 
(FERC), which represents the extent to which current stock returns reflect foreknowledge of future 
earnings realizations. We measure industry-level FERC as the coefficient on future earnings in 
annual, industry-level regressions of current returns on future earnings, as well as on current and 
past earnings. A higher coefficient on future earnings indicates that investors have greater foresight 
about future earnings prospects for the industry. Prior research indicates that FERC is higher in 
more transparent environments, indicating that investors are better able to anticipate future 
earnings as transparency increases (Choi, Myers, Zang, and Ziebart 2011; Gelb and Zarowin, 2002; 
Lundholm and Myers, 2002). Given that FERC reflects the existence of transparent information 
that allows capital market participants to better anticipate future earnings, we expect that the same 
information would allow product market participants to formulate more timely competitive 
responses. Therefore, we expect the persistence of abnormal profits at the industry level to be 
negatively related to industry level transparency, as proxied by FERC. This possibility is consistent 
with the concept of proprietary costs, which features prominently in models of discretionary 
disclosure (e.g., Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; Feltham and Xie, 1992; Hayes and Lundholm, 
1996; Verrecchia 1983, 1990; Wagenhofer, 1990).  
We use FERC as our transparency measure rather than indicators of information from 
individual sources like management forecasts or conference calls. We make this choice because 
FERC encompasses all publicly available information from all sources. Competitive product 
market participants presumably do not constrain themselves to information from a particular 
source. Moreover, there is a high degree of substitutability among different information sources. 
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That is, two firms could have an economically equivalent amount of public information but 
management could be the primary source of public information for one firm while information 
intermediaries could be the primary source of public information for the second firm. Therefore, 
we require a measure of transparency that reflects all the information to which product market 
participants have access. FERC meets this requirement.  
Using both cross-sectional and time series designs on a sample of industry-years from 1980 
to 2012, we regress industry-level earnings persistence on the prior year’s industry-level FERC. 
Consistent with our prediction, industry-level earnings persistence is negatively related to 
industry-level FERC. This finding indicates that transparency facilitates the competitive process, 
thereby hastening the erosion of abnormal profits. Further analysis indicates that the overall effect 
of transparency is concentrated in firms with abnormally low profits but not in those with 
abnormally high profits. This finding indicates that the primary effect of transparency is to allow 
firms with abnormally low profits to adapt to competitive challenges either by exposing such firms 
to industry best practices or by facilitating more effective monitoring of such firms. However, this 
effect does not directly lead to an erosion of abnormally high profits. Thus, our findings indicate 
that transparency does not necessarily lead to a redistribution of profits in a zero-sum sense, but 
can actually facilitate overall growth in an industry by contributing to the spread of best practices. 
Our findings add to economists’ longstanding examination of the factors that affect whether profits 
converge to competitive levels quickly and completely (Mueller, 1986; Jacobsen, 1988; Stigler, 
1963). 
In supplemental analysis, we exploit the DuPont decomposition, separating ROA into 
profit margin and asset turnover, in order to determine whether transparency has a differential 
impact on the persistence of these two components of overall profitability. We find stronger 
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evidence that transparency is associated with lower persistence of profit margins but not of asset 
turnover. This finding is consistent with Soliman’s (2008) argument that competition may have 
greater impact on profit margins than on asset turnover. Thus, transparency seems more useful in 
eliminating differences in profitability attributable to input and output prices, as reflected in profit 
margins, than it is in eliminating differences in profitability attributable to operational efficiency, 
as reflected in asset turnover. 
We also examine whether transparency affects the sensitivity of industry-level entry and 
exit to changes in profit expectations for the industry. Theories of perfect competition posit that 
there will be greater entry into (exit from) industries with increasing (declining) profit prospects. 
Using industry-level establishment data from the Census Bureau, we regress the net entry into the 
industry in the current year on the percentage of firms in the industry that experience a subsequent 
improvement in ROA. We find that this association is positive, consistent with firms' entry into 
(exit from) industries reflecting foreknowledge of which industries have improving (or declining) 
profitability prospects.  We further find that this association increases with transparency. This 
finding provides further indication that greater transparency at the industry level allows firms to 
respond more quickly to changes in industry conditions. 
This study makes a number of contributions. First, our finding that transparency is 
associated with lower earnings persistence informs several research streams. Specifically, our 
finding informs the substantial economic literature that examines the factors that that allow 
abnormal profits to persist (i.e., that impede profitability convergence). Economists are interested 
in this issue because lack of convergence can be considered an indication of resource misallocation 
or disequilibrium (Brozen, 1970; Mueller, 1977). Hence, they interpret factors that facilitate the 
convergence process as contributing to improved product market conditions. Therefore, our 
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finding suggests that information transparency generally, and accounting transparency 
specifically, beneficially impact the product market. In addition, our finding is relevant to strategy 
research that also examines the factors that affect the sustainability of abnormal profits but from 
the perspective of managers who seek to reinforce competitive advantages (Hunt and Morgan 
1995; Jacobsen 1988; McGahan and Porter 1997; McGahan and Porter 1999; Roberts 1999; 
Roberts and Dowling 2002; McGahan and Porter 2003; McAfee, Mialon, and Williams 2004). 
Finally, our finding is relevant to accounting research that examines the factors that affect earnings 
persistence (e.g. Lev 1983; Baginski, Lorek, Willinger, and Branson 1999; Cheng 2005), which 
has implications for earnings forecasting — a key fundamental analysis task. 
Second, our findings that transparency about future earnings affects the natural competitive 
forces that govern the product market are of interest to accounting researchers. Given that the 
primary role of accounting information is to facilitate investment decisions, accounting researchers 
have largely focused on the role of accounting in the functioning of capital markets. However, our 
findings that accounting information has an impact on the product market indicate that the 
economic impact of accounting information is broader than previously acknowledged. 
Third, our study provides indirect evidence related to proprietary costs. Although such 
costs feature prominently in theoretical models, they are challenging to document empirically. 
Most studies examine whether firms make disclosure decisions based on the belief that proprietary 
costs exist but do not provide evidence on whether product market participants actually act on 
available information about their competitors (Harris 1998; Berger and Hann 2007; Li 2010). Our 
finding that information transparency affects the persistence of abnormal profits shows that 
competitors act on public information about their rivals — a necessary precondition for the 
existence of proprietary costs.  
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Finally, our study provides complementary insights to Francis, Huang, Khurana, and 
Pereira (2009) about the effect of transparency on industry growth. While Francis et al. (2009) 
focus on the capital market as the channel through which transparency positively affects industry 
growth, our evidence suggests an additional channel. Specifically, our finding that the primary 
impact of transparency appears to be to facilitate profitability improvements of underperforming 
firms without directly eroding the profits of highly profitable firms suggests that transparency does 
not necessarily have a zero-sum effect wherein some firms benefit at the expense of others. Rather, 
transparency can contribute to overall industry growth through the spread of best practices. 
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the related theory and 
develops hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the research design. Section 4 discusses the sample. 
Section 5 describes the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Product market competition and information transparency 
In competitive markets, firms with abnormally high profits attract entry by other firms that 
offer similar products at lower prices, until all the abnormal profits disappear, while firms with 
abnormally low profits are either acquired by or are driven from the market by their competitors. 
Unless otherwise impeded, the net effect of this competitive process in the long run is that the 
profits of all firms in the industry converge such that both abnormally high and abnormally low 
profits are eliminated (Bishop 2009; Bou and Satorra 2007; Flåm 1995; Gschwandtner 2005; 
Jacobsen 1988; Mueller 1986; Robinson 1934; Stigler 1957; Waring 1996). Stated alternatively, 
the theoretical effect of competition is to lower the sustainability (i.e. persistence) of both 
abnormally high and abnormally low profits.  
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Despite the intuitive appeal of this prediction, prior research documents many real world 
instances in which abnormal profits persist (Mueller 1986, Waring 1996, Mueller 1977, Cheng 
2005). The persistence of abnormal profits is important from a number of research perspectives. 
From an economic perspective, persistent abnormal profits are at odds with the notion of perfect 
competition, which provides the theoretical benchmark for predicting and interpreting long-run 
equilibria in product markets (Stigler 1957). Perfect competition is not only a theoretical but also 
a normative benchmark. Therefore, economists interpret violations of the central prediction of 
perfect competition (that abnormal profits are quickly eliminated) to be evidence of disequilibrium 
or misallocation of resources (Brozen 1970; Mueller 1977). On the other hand, the existence of 
persistent abnormal profits is desirable from a strategy perspective as it is consistent with 
individual managers' objective to create sustainable competitive advantages (Hunt and Morgan 
1995; Jacobsen 1988; McGahan and Porter 1997; McGahan and Porter 1999; Roberts 1999; 
Roberts and Dowling 2002; McGahan and Porter 2003; McAfee, Mialon, and Williams 2004). 
From an accounting perspective, the existence of persistent abnormal profits has implications for 
earnings forecasting, which is a key valuation task. 
 Given that the existence of persistent abnormal profits has important implications, 
substantial research attention has been devoted to documenting the factors that impede the 
elimination of abnormal profits. Previously identified factors fall under the broad category of 
barriers to entry, which make it difficult for potential entrants to compete against the most 
profitable firms.  Barriers to entry reflect the variety of factors that reinforce competitive 
advantages. These factors include regulatory or legal protections that confer exclusive rights to 
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resources, structural industry conditions as well as specific competencies that individual firms 
develop that other firms can not readily imitate.1  
One of the most important theoretical requirements for perfect competition is that all 
market participants including participating firms in the product market have perfect information 
(e.g. Senior 1938; Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983; Hayek 1948; Knight 1921). This requirement 
implicitly assumes that economic agents require information upon which to act in order to take 
the competitive actions that lead to profitability convergence. Economists have acknowledged 
how critical information is in promoting competition.2 At the same time, they acknowledge that 
the theoretical ideal of perfect information may not always be met.3 However, prior research has 
not examined whether variation in the degree to which this requirement is met is associated with 
variation in the degree to which the key prediction of perfect competition (i.e. quick erosion of 
abnormal profits) obtains. As Ozga (1960) asserts, “[t]he possibility, however, that…knowledge 
                                                          
1 Stigler (1963) and Qualls (1974) argue that highly concentrated industries experience a slower mean convergence 
of profitability. Similar effects apply to R&D and advertising investment which create potential innovations and 
product loyalty (Roberts, 1999; Bunch and Smiley, 2001). Additionally, employees’ skill level represents industry 
complexity, one of the main informational impediments to imitation (Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner 1981; 
Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Mansfield, 1985; Dierickx and Cool, 1989).  On the other hand, number of firms and 
capital intensity are normally treated as factors that expedite the convergence process because they possibly increase 
the market competition and the efficiency of capital utilization (Waring 1996). 
2  Mas-Colell (1998) points to perfect knowledge and market transparency as key assumptions to reach market 
equilibrium (p. 18). Stiglitz (1985) argues that “when one of the central pieces (the assumption of perfect information) 
is removed, the structure [of perfect market competition] collapses” (p. 26). Salop (1976) and Stiglitz (1989) argue 
that imperfect information can contribute to market power, which works against perfectly competitive outcomes. In 
particular, Salop (1976) argues, “because imperfect [and costly] information gives firms market power at least in the 
short run and often in the long run as well...the relevant market structure with imperfect information is not perfect 
competition but rather [close to] monopolistic competition” (p. 240). Allen (2014) points to the fact that producers 
undergo costly information searches to underscore the economic importance of information for product market 
competition.   
3 Senior (1938) states, "few capitalists can estimate, except upon an average of some years, the amounts of their own 
profits and still fewer can estimate those of their neighbors."  Ozga (1960) claims that “[t]he fact that buyers and 
sellers may have only imperfect knowledge of the conditions on the market plays an important part in the economic 
theory of advertising” (p. 29). Similarly, Stiglitz (1985) argues that “[i]ndividuals have finite capacities to gather and 
process information, while communication of information between individuals is both costly and imperfect” (p. 36). 
Demsetz (1973) also points out that information is costly to obtain (p. 3) 
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may not be perfect, has never been seriously faced up to” (p. 29). We address this issue directly 
in this study. 
We argue that transparency has the potential to impact the functioning of the product 
market based on the substantial evidence that transparency affects the functioning of the capital 
market. Specifically, prior research has shown that transparency is associated with greater 
liquidity, lower cost of capital, and lower stock return volatility.4 These findings indicate that 
transparency enhances investors' understanding of firms' economic performance, which facilitates 
investment decisions by lowering investors' estimation risk. By extension, we argue that it is 
possible that transparency enhances product market participants' understanding of their rivals' 
economic performance, thereby facilitating their competitive responses.  
Francis et al. (2009) find a positive relationship between transparency and the overall 
industry growth rate, which provides evidence that transparency does have product market 
implications. They interpret their finding as indicating that transparency reduces “information 
frictions which block capital flows to the best investment growth opportunities…” (p. 945).  While 
they focus on how transparency affects the product market through the capital market, we consider 
the possibility that transparency affects the product market directly through its impact on product 
market participants. If product market participants act on transparent information about their rivals 
to formulate competitive responses, then the profits of competing firms should converge to a 
greater extent as industry-level transparency increases. We therefore investigate whether industry-
                                                          
4Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (2003) find country-level earnings opacity is associated with greater country-level 
cost of capital and lower trading in a country's stock market. Barth, Konchitchki, and Landsman (2013) extend these 
findings to the firm level by documenting a negative relation between firm-level cost of capital and earnings 
transparency. Transparency has a similar impact in the debt market as prior studies document that transparency is 
negatively associated with cost of debt and credit spreads and positively associated with credit ratings (Yu 2005; 
DeBoskey and Gillett 2013). In addition, prior studies show that transparency is associated with greater liquidity and 
less stock return volatility (Hutton et al. 2009; Lang and Maffett, 2011; Pagano and Röell 1996; Sadka 2011; Ng, 
2011).  
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level transparency affects the extent to which industries achieve profitability convergence by 
examining the association between industry-level transparency and the persistence of profits 
within an industry. 
Hypothesis 
Competition incentivizes product market participants to take appropriate actions to 
eliminate both abnormally high and abnormally low profits, thereby reducing overall earnings 
persistence. Perfect information is a key requirement for perfect competition, which implies that 
economic agents require high quality information in order to take appropriate competitive actions. 
Information transparency likely reflects the extent to which industries conform to the theoretical 
ideal of perfect information. Therefore, we expect information transparency to be a determinant of 
the industry-level earnings persistence. We, therefore, test the following hypothesis, stated in the 
alternative form. 
H1.  Industry-level information transparency is negatively related to industry-level earnings 
persistence. 
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Measuring information transparency 
We capture information transparency using FERC, which represents the extent to which 
current stock returns reflect foreknowledge of future earnings realizations. Prior research indicates 
that FERC is greater in more transparent environments, indicating that investors are better able to 
anticipate future earnings as transparency increases. Specifically, prior research has linked higher 
FERCs to more informative disclosure policies (Choi et al. 2011; Gelb and Zarowin 2002; 
Lundholm and Myers 2002), more transparent segment disclosures (Ettredge, Kwon, Smith, and 
Zarowin 2005), more transparent cash flow statements (Orpurt and Zang, 2009), and more active 
short-selling (Drake, Myers, Myers and Stuart 2015). As Drake et al. (2015) state, the accumulated 
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weight of prior research indicates that “...FERCs increase as more information about future 
earnings becomes available” (p. 751). Thus, FERC, measured at the industry level, is a useful 
summary measure of the richness of an industry's information environment.  
We use FERC to measure information transparency rather than indicators of information 
from individual sources (e.g., management forecasts or conference calls) because FERC 
encompasses publicly available information from all sources. Publicly available information about 
a firm can come from a variety of sources including management and information intermediaries 
such as analysts or the press. Competitive product market participants presumably do not constrain 
themselves to information from a particular source. Moreover, there is a high degree of 
substitutability between information sources. For instance, two firms could have an equivalent 
amount of publicly available information but the information for the first firm could come 
primarily from management while the information for the second firm could come primarily from 
analysts. Since product market participants will use all available information from any available 
source, using a single source to measure the total amount of publicly available information could 
lead to measurement error. In the example above, for instance, basing measurement of total public 
information on the provision of management forecasts would lead to the first firm being classified 
as having more public information than the second even though they actually have an equivalent 
amount of publicly available information. For this reason, we use FERC as our transparency 
measure because it encompasses publicly available information from all sources, thereby 
facilitating over-time and cross-sectional comparisons of the amount of publicly available 
information about firms' future earnings. 
We estimate the following regression based on Collins, Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan 
(1994). 
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RETt =α0+ α1 X3t + α2Xt + α3Xt-1 + α4RET3t + εt+1                                                   (1) 
where:  
RETt is the annual buy-and-hold return for the 12-month period spanning from the third 
month after the fiscal year-end for year t-1. 
 
Xt is income before extraordinary items-available to common, scaled by market value three 
months after the year t-1 fiscal year-end. 
  
X3t is the sum of income before extraordinary items-available to common for the three 
years following the current year (i.e., for years t + 1, t + 2, and t + 3) divided by market 
value (closing price x the number of shares outstanding) measured at the year t-1 fiscal 
year-end.  
 
RET3t are the buy-and-hold returns for the three-year period following the current year 
(i.e., starting three months after the current fiscal year-end). 
 
We estimate equation (1) annually by industry, requiring at least 25 observations per 
industry year for reliable estimation. The coefficient on future earnings (α1) represents our 
industry-year measure of transparency (TRANSt). 
Measuring industry-level earnings persistence 
To measure earnings persistence, we estimate the following first-order autoregressive 
model separately for each industry-year.  
ROAt+1 = a0 + a1ROAt + e        (2)  
where a1 captures the extent to which current return on assets (ROAt) persist in the subsequent 
year. We estimate equation (2) annually by industry. The coefficient on ROAt (a1) represents our 
industry-year measure of earnings persistence (PERSISTi,t). As discussed in Appendix B, we note 
that this measure of industry-level earnings persistence can be interpreted as capturing the 
convergence of profits within an industry.  
  
14 
 
Regression Models 
We test our formal hypotheses using both time series and cross-sectional regression 
designs. We use the following regression model for our time-series tests. 
PERSISTt+1 = a0 + a1 TRANSt + e       (3) 
We estimate equation (3) for each industry with at least 20 yearly observations. Equation (3) 
exploits variation over time in the extent of available information about future earnings but 
assumes that other structural factors that affect industry-level competition (e.g. barriers to entry 
and industry concentration) are stable over time. Coefficient a1 captures the extent to which the 
sustainability of profits in year t depends on the availability of information in year t about year t+1 
profits.  If transparency facilitates the competitive process then we expect an industry's profits to 
be less persistent in years when there is greater transparency. That is, we expect greater availability 
of information in year t about future profits to intensify competition in year t+1, thereby leading 
to a faster elimination of abnormally high and abnormally low profits in year t+1 and a lower 
overall persistence of earnings. Thus, we expect a1 < 0. We test the statistical significance of the 
mean and median a1 for all industries with sufficient observations to estimate equation (3) .   
We use the following regression model for our cross-sectional tests. 
PERSISTt+1 = a0 + a1 TRANSt + a2 INTANGINTENSITYt + a3 CAPINTENSITYt  
+ a4 HERFt + e         (4) 
We estimate equation (4) yearly for all industries using weighted least squares where the 
weight is the number of observations used to estimate PERSISTt+1. Coefficient a1 in equation (4) 
captures whether more transparent industries have less persistent earnings. A finding that a1 < 0 
would support our hypothesis. 
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We control for various determinants of industry-level competition: intangible investment 
(INTANGINTENSITY), based on prior research that R&D and advertising expenditures contribute 
to unique capabilities that are hard for competitors to imitate (Bunch and Smiley, 1992; Roberts, 
1999; Villalonga); capital intensity (CAPINTENSITY), based on prior research that capital-
intensive industries are more competitive (Waring, 1996) and that earnings are less persistent in 
capital intensive industries (Lev 1983; Baginski et al. 1999) and the Herfindal index (HERF), 
because more concentrated industries are less competitive. See Appendix A for detailed definitions 
of variables.  Following Fama-McBeth (1973), we determine the statistical significance of the 
coefficients in equation (4) based on tests of the mean of the yearly coefficients. In addition, we 
test the statistical significance of the median of the yearly coefficients. 
 
IV. SAMPLE 
We classify industries based on two-digit SIC codes. In addition, for each industry-year, 
we require the industry to have at least 25 firms with the necessary data to estimate equation (1) 
in order to derive a reliable industry-level transparency score for the year. These requirements 
result in a sample of 779 (892) industry-years from 1980 to 2012 for our time-series (cross-
sectional) tests.  
Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. The mean and median are both about 
0.7, consistent with previous findings that earnings are highly persistent but do not behave 
completely as a random walk. The mean and median of TRANSt are approximately 0.4, confirming 
prior findings that current returns reflect some degree of foreknowledge of future earnings. 
However, the interquartile range of TRANSt is 0.40, which indicates that there is also substantial 
variation across industries in the degree of transparency.  
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Panel B of Table 1 provides the mean and median levels of PERSISTt and TRANSt across 
years for each industry in the sample that appears at least 20 years. Industries with the highest 
average persistence include Apparel & Accessory Stores, Paper & Allied Products, Engineering 
& Management Services, and Chemical & Allied Products. Industries with the lowest average 
persistence include Oil & Gas Extraction, Transportation Equipment, Fabricated Metal Products, 
and Communications. Industries with the highest average transparency include, Apparel & 
Accessory Stores, Fabricated Metal Products, and Printing & Publishing. Industries with the lowest 
average transparency include Chemical & Allied Products, Oil & Gas Extraction, and Engineering 
& Management Services.  
Table 2 presents correlations. PERSISTt and TRANSt are significantly negatively related (p 
< 0.05), providing initial support for our expectation that profits are less persistent in more 
transparent industries. We also find that persistence is significantly negatively related to capital 
intensity, consistent with Waring’s (1996) argument that competition is less intense in more capital 
intensive industries and with prior empirical findings of a negative association between capital 
intensity and earnings persistence (Lev 1983 and Baginski et al. 1999).    
 
V.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Hypotheses tests 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the results of our time-series hypothesis test. Consistent with 
expectations, the mean and median of the industry-level time-series coefficient on TRANSt is 
significantly negative at p < 0.01 (mean α1 = -0.086; median α1 = -0.093). This finding indicates 
that greater availability of information in year t about future earnings leads to year t earnings being 
less persistent in the subsequent year. This empirical finding is consistent with the idea that firms 
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use available information in year t to implement competitive strategies in year t+1 that erode 
abnormally high or abnormally low earnings in year t.   
Panel B of Table 3 presents the results of our cross-sectional hypothesis test. Consistent 
with expectations, the mean and median of the yearly coefficient on TRANSt is significantly 
negative at p < 0.01 (mean α1 = -0.077; median α1 = -0.035). This finding indicates that earnings 
in year t are less persistent in industries where there is greater availability of information in year t 
about future earnings. This empirical finding is consistent with the idea that firms in more 
transparent industries are better able to implement competitive strategies in future years than firms 
in less transparent industries. We also find that earnings persistence is negatively associated with 
capital intensity, consistent with prior research (Lev 1983; Waring 1996; Baginski et al. 1999).  
The results in Table 3 indicate that transparency plays an important role in facilitating the 
competitive forces that ultimately lead to profitability convergence. As discussed previously, 
transparency can lower the sustainability of abnormally high profits by providing information that 
facilitates competitive entry and can lower the sustainability of abnormally low profits by 
providing information that facilitates performance improvements for underperforming firms.5 We 
examine which of these possible impacts drives our overall finding. Specifically, Panel A of Table 
4 provides separate time-series tests of the effect of transparency on one-year ahead ROA growth 
for firm-years where ROA is above the industry median for the year and for firm-years where ROA 
is below the industry median. For firm-years where ROA is above the industry median, the mean 
and median coefficient on TRANSt are significantly positive at p < 0.10 but the magnitudes are 
modest (mean α1 = 0.007; median α1 = 0.003). For firm-years where ROA is below the industry 
                                                          
5 For example, transparent information can provide underperforming firms with more insight about industry best 
practice. In addition, transparent industry-level information can provide better benchmarks for monitoring 
underperforming firms. 
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median, the mean and median coefficient on TRANSt are significant at p < 0.01 and are 
substantially larger in magnitude than the corresponding coefficients for firm-years where ROA is 
above the industry median (mean α1 = 0.018; median α1 = 0.011).  
Panel B of Table 4 presents separate cross-sectional tests of the impact of transparency on 
one-year-ahead ROA growth for firm-years where ROA is above the industry median for the year 
and for firm-years where ROA is below the industry median for the year. For firm-years where 
ROA is above the industry median, the mean and median coefficients on TRANSt are insignificant. 
For firm-years where ROA is below the industry median, the mean and median coefficients on 
TRANSt are significant at p < 0.01 and are substantially larger in magnitude than the corresponding 
coefficients where ROA is below the industry median.  
The results in Table 4 indicate that the primary effect of transparency on industry 
competition is to provide information that facilitates performance improvements in low performing 
firms. Interestingly, transparency is not associated with earnings declines for high profit firms. An 
implication of these combined results is that transparency does not lead to a simple redistribution 
of existing profits in a zero-sum game sense. Rather, transparency appears to permit 
underperforming firms to improve their profitability without sacrificing the profits of high 
performing firms. This provides an addition explanation to that offered by Francis et al. (2009) for 
why transparency contributes to overall industry growth.  
Supplemental test of hypotheses: DuPont decomposition 
To gain further insight into the drivers of our basic result, we exploit the DuPont 
decomposition, which separates ROA into profit margin and asset turnover. Profit margins are 
largely driven by input and prices whereas asset turnover reflects operational efficiency. Soliman 
(2008) argues that competition likely affects the two components of profitability differently. 
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Specifically, he argues that competition may have more impact on margins, which are affected by 
market prices, than on asset turnover, which depends on internal processes that may not be easily 
imitated. Therefore, transparency may likewise differentially impact the persistence or 
convergence of these two components of overall profitability. To explore this possibility, we first 
compute the industry level persistence of profit margin and asset turnover. We then reperform our 
time-series and cross-sectional hypothesis tests using variants of equations (3) and (4) after 
substituting these alternative persistence measures as dependent variables.  
Panel A of Table 5 presents the time-series analyses. When persistence in profit margins is 
the dependent variable, the mean and median of the industry-level time-series coefficient on 
TRANSt are significantly negative p < 0.01 (mean α1 = 0.108; median α1 = 0.111). When 
persistence in asset turnover is the dependent variable, the mean and median cross-sectional 
coefficient on TRANSt are insignificant. Panel B of Table 5 presents the cross-sectional analyses. 
The results corroborate the time-series results. When persistence in profit margins is the dependent 
variable, the mean and median of the yearly cross-sectional coefficient on TRANSt is significantly 
negative at p < 0.05 (mean α1 = 0.108; median α1 = 0.111). When persistence in asset turnover is 
the dependent variable, the mean and median cross-sectional coefficients on TRANSt are 
insignificant.  
Thus, the overall impact of transparency appears to be through its impact on profit margins. 
This finding indicates that greater availability of information in year t about future earnings leads 
to year t margins being less persistent in the subsequent year. This empirical finding is consistent 
with the idea that firms use available information in year t to implement competitive strategies in 
year t+1 that erode abnormally high or abnormally low profit margins in year t. 
20 
 
As with our analysis of ROA, we examine whether the impact of transparency on ROA 
components is concentrated in firm-years where the ROA component is above or below the 
industry median for that year.  Specifically, Panel A of Table 6 provides separate time-series tests 
of the effect of transparency on one-year ahead growth in gross margin for firm-years where gross 
margin is above the industry median for the year and for firm-years where gross margin is below 
the industry median. For firm-years where margin is above the industry median, the mean 
coefficient on TRANSt is significantly positive at p < 0.05 (mean α1 = 0.011) and the median 
industry-level time-series coefficients on TRANSt is insignificant. The corresponding mean and 
median coefficients on TRANSt for firm-years where margin is below the industry median are also 
significantly positive at p < 0.05 (mean α1 = 0.037; median α1 = 0.013). However, the mean 
(median) coefficient on TRANSt for the below industry median observations of 0.037 (0.013) is 
about three (six) times the corresponding mean (median) coefficient on TRANSt for the above 
industry median observations of 0.011(0.002). Thus, the impact of transparency on margins 
appears to be through promoting improvement in margins for firms with below average margins 
rather than through eroding the margins of firms with above average margins.  
Panel B of Table 6 also presents separate cross-sectional tests of the impact of transparency 
on one-year-ahead growth in margin for firm-years where margin is above the industry median for 
the year and for firm-years where margin is below the industry median for the year. The results 
largely corroborate those from the time series analysis. For both firm-years where margin is above 
the industry median and firm-years where margin is below the industry median, the mean and 
median yearly cross-sectional coefficients on TRANSt are significantly positive at p < 0.05. 
However, the mean (median) coefficient on TRANSt for the below industry median observations 
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of 0.014 (0.008) is about 1.4 (2) times the corresponding mean (median) coefficient on TRANSt 
for the above industry median observations of 0.01 (0.004). 
Panel A (Panel B) of Table 6 also presents the corresponding time-series (cross-sectional) 
analysis for asset turnover. The coefficient on TRANSt is insignificant in both time-series and cross-
sectional analyses for firm-years where asset turnover is above and below the industry median. 
These results are consistent with the findings in Table 5 that transparency has no association with 
the persistence of asset turnover. 
The results in Table 5 indicate that the impact of transparency in reducing earnings 
persistence is driven largely by the gross margin component while the results in Table 6 indicate 
that the impact of transparency is to accelerate gross margin improvement in firms with below 
average margins rather than to erode the margins of firms with above average margins. By contrast, 
transparency has no impact on the persistence of asset turnover. These findings suggest that 
transparency, as reflected in FERC, is more effective in eliminating profitability differences due 
to input and output prices (as reflected in margins) than in eliminating those due to internal choices 
that lead to operational efficiency (as reflected in asset turnover).  
Additional analysis of industry entry and exit 
While the results of our hypothesis tests are consistent with transparency facilitating firms' 
competitive actions, we provide more direct evidence for this interpretation by examining whether 
transparency is associated with the sensitivity of industry entry and exit rates to changes in 
expected industry profits. According to the theory of perfect competition, a key manifestation of 
competition is the phenomenon of firms entering (exiting) industries as profitable opportunities 
increase (decline). As Siegfried and Evans (1994) points out, “entry decisions depend on the 
mechanism by which firms form expectations about future post-entry profit conditions” (p. 124). 
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Similarly, Kessides (1990, 1991) also find that the rate of net entry into U.S. manufacturing 
industries increases with industry profits. Hence, entry-exit should be related to the extent to which 
profit expectations for an industry change. If transparency helps firms adjust more quickly to 
changing profit expectations then the relation should be more pronounced as transparency 
increases. We test this possibility by estimating the following equation: 
NETENTRYt+1= α0 + α1 ΔFUTUREINDROAt + α2 ΔFUTUREINDROAt ×TRANSt + α3 TRANSt +   
  α4 Xt+1+ εt+1         (5)  
 
where:  
NETENTRYt+1 is the net expansion in establishments for an industry in year t+1 divided by 
the number of initial establishments based on establishment data provided by the U.S. 
Census Bureau. Net expansion is calculated as the number of new establishments + the 
number of existing establishments that expanded their work force - the number of 
establishment deaths - the number of establishments that contracted their work force. 
 
ΔFUTUREINDROAt is the percentage of firms in the industry with an average ROA in 
years t, t+1, and t+2 that are greater than its ROA in year t-1. 
 
Xt+1 represents the set of control variables described in section III and in Appendix A. 
 
ΔFUTUREINDROAt captures the extent to which there is pervasive improvement in an 
industry's profit outlook. If firms' migration into or away from an industry reflects foresight about 
the industry's future profit prospects then we expect α1 > 0. If transparency facilitates firms' 
competitive responses then their entry-exit decisions should reflect greater foresight about an 
industry's future profit prospects. Therefore, we expect α2 > 0. Note that the sample used for this 
test differs from the sample we used to test our primary hypotheses because U.S. Census Bureau 
data use NAICS industry codes rather than SIC codes and because we have establishment data 
only for 1997–2010.   
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Table 7 presents the results of estimating equation (5). We report variants of equation (5) 
to demonstrate the robustness of results to the incorporation of multiple interactions. Because the 
inferences of our tests are the same across both specifications, we limit our discussion to the basic 
model with control variables included only as main effects—that is, column (4). The results are 
consistent with our expectations. Specifically, α1 is significantly positive (α1 = 0.135; p < 0.01), 
consistent with the theory that firms' entry and exit rates reflect foreknowledge of profitable 
opportunities in the industry. As expected, as transparency increases, firms' entry and exit 
decisions reflect greater foreknowledge of profitable opportunities in the industry (α2 = 0.191; p < 
0.01). These findings provide direct evidence of how competitors within an industry respond under 
differing levels of transparency. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
We examine the association between industry-level transparency and the persistence of 
profits within an industry. Because competition theoretically reduces overall earnings persistence 
by reducing the sustainability of both abnormally high and abnormally low profits, our 
examination sheds light on the impact of transparency on product market competition. Perfect 
information is a key theoretical requirement for perfect competition, which highlights the 
theoretical importance of high quality information in allowing firms to compete. Despite the 
theorized importance of transparency in promoting product market competition, prior research has 
not provided empirical evidence on this possibility. We provide such evidence in this study. 
 Based on prior research that stock returns reflect greater anticipation of future earnings in 
more transparent environments, we use the future earnings response coefficient measured at the 
industry level as a proxy for industry-level information transparency. We argue that the same 
information that allows capital-market participants to anticipate future earnings should also allow 
product market participants to identify profitable opportunities to exploit.  
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We find that transparency is associated with lower earnings persistence, which indicates 
that transparency hastens the convergence process. Supplemental analysis indicates that the overall 
impact of transparency is driven primarily by its role in reducing the persistence of gross margins, 
which reflect the impact of input and output prices. By contrast, transparency plays no discernible 
role in reducing the persistence of asset turnover, which reflects the internal processes that drive 
operational efficiency. 
To bolster our interpretation that transparency facilitates competitive responses in the 
product market, we examine whether information transparency affects the sensitivity of industry-
level entry and exit decisions to changes in industry profit expectations. We find that as 
transparency increases, industry-level entry and exit reflect greater foresight about the existence 
of future profit opportunities in that industry. This finding provides further indication that 
transparency at the industry level allows firms to respond more quickly to changes in an industry’s 
profit outlook. 
Our findings contribute to the extensive academic literature that examines the factors that 
impede profitability convergence. Moreover, our findings demonstrate that the effects of 
information transparency, particularly about future earnings, extend beyond the capital market to 
the product market.  
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APPENDIX A 
Variable definitions 
 
Variable Name Description 
Hypothesis Test Variables 
PERSISTt+1 industry-level earnings persistence, measured as 
coefficient a1from estimating equation (1) 
annually by industry.  
TRANSt industry-level information transparency for year 
t, measured as the industry-level future earnings 
response coefficient (FERC), which is coefficient 
a1from estimating equation (2) annually by 
industry.  
Supplemental Hypothesis Test Variables 
PERSIST_MARGIN t+1 industry-level margin persistence, measured as 
coefficient a1from estimating equation (1) 
annually by industry after substituting year t 
gross margin for year t ROA and year t+1 gross 
margin for year t+1 ROA. 
PERSIST_TURN t+1 industry-level asset turnover persistence, 
measured as coefficient a1from estimating 
equation (1) annually by industry after 
substituting year t asset turnover for year t ROA 
and year t+1 asset turnover for year t+1 ROA.  
GROWTH_ROAt+1 ROAt+1 – ROAt  
GROWTH_MARGINt+1 MARGINt+1 – MARGINt where MARGINt = gross 
margin 
GROWTH_TURNt+1 TURNt+1 – TURNt where TURN = asset turnover 
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APPENDIX A continued 
Variable definitions 
 
Control Variables: 
INTANGINTENSITY intangible intensity for the industry, measured as the sum of both R&D 
and advertising expenditures for the industry divided by the sum of 
sales for the industry. 
CAPINTENSITY 
 
capital intensity for the industry, measured as the sum of depreciation 
expenses for the industry divided by the sum of sales for the industry. 
HERF 
 
Herfindahl Index, calculated as the sum of squared market shares based 
on sales for the industry. 
Variables for Additional Analysis 
NETENTRYt+1 the net expansion in establishments for an industry in year t+1 divided 
by the number of initial establishments, based on establishment data 
provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. Net expansion is calculated as the 
number of new establishments + the number of existing establishments 
that expanded their work force - the number of establishment deaths - 
the number of establishments that contracted their work force. 
ΔFUTUREINDROAt the percentage of firms in the industry with an average ROA in years t, 
t+1 and t+2 that is greater than its ROA in year t-1. 
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APPENDIX B 
Relationship between Industry-Level Earnings Persistence and Profitability Convergence 
Recall that our measure of industry-level earnings persistence is the coefficient on current 
ROA in the following first-order autoregressive model separately for each industry-year.  
ROAt+1 = a0 + a1ROAt + e        (2)  
In this appendix, we demonstrate that our measure of industry-level earnings persistence 
reflects profitability convergence, which is the key predicted outcome of industry competition. 
Specifically, industry level earnings persistence is consistent with the concept of beta 
convergence in the macroeconomic literature where per capita income growth rates of countries 
with initially low per capita income is expected to exceed the per capita income growth rates of 
countries with initially high per capital income. In the macroeconomics literature, beta 
convergence is estimated based on the following model   
 ∆Yt+1 = β0 + β1 Yt + e        (B1) 
where Y is per capita country-level income. Beta convergence obtains when β1 < 0 . Beta 
convergence occurs as countries with initially low per capita income adopt the practices of the 
more successful countries and as the competitive advantages of countries with initially high per 
capital income are gradually eroded (e.g. Solow, 1956; Baumol, 1986; Barro and Sali-i-Martin, 
1992; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992).  
The concept of beta convergence can also describe industry-level dynamics. If profits 
within an industry follow beta convergence then firms with initially low profitability will grow 
more than firms with initially high profitability. Beta convergence occurs at the industry level if 
low profitability firms formulate responses that allow them to more effectively compete with the 
more profitable firms. 
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If one replaces Y with ROA in equation (B1) and estimates it by industry then β1 captures 
beta convergence at the industry level. In comparing equation (2) with equation (B1), we see that 
earnings persistence from equation (2) is perfectly correlated with beta convergence from 
equation (B1). That is, lower earnings persistence (lower a1 in equation (1))  is equivalent to 
higher beta convergence (lower β1 in equation (B1)). In untabulated analyses, we conduct our 
hypotheses tests using industry-level beta convergence and obtain identical inferences to those 
using industry-level earnings persistence. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Description 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
VarName N mean std q1 median q3 
PERSIST 892 0.707 0.260 0.543 0.717 0.866 
TRANS 892 0.404 0.396 0.175 0.364 0.618 
INTANGINTENSITY 892 0.029 0.030 0.005 0.020 0.043 
CAPINTENSITY 892 0.045 0.035 0.027 0.037 0.051 
HERF 892 0.090 0.067 0.052 0.073 0.105 
 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 1 continued 
Panel B: Mean and Median Persistence and Transparency Scores by Industry 
   PERSIST TRANS 
indus description N Mean Median Mean Median 
13 Oil & Gas Extraction 31 0.58 0.63 0.18 0.20 
20 Food & Kindred Products 31 0.76 0.78 0.44 0.35 
23 Apparel & Other Textile Products 22 0.72 0.70 0.41 0.45 
26 Paper & Allied Products 24 0.83 0.82 0.48 0.43 
27 Printing & Publishing 28 0.79 0.83 0.54 0.61 
28 Chemical & Allied Products 31 0.80 0.82 0.15 0.13 
30 
Rubber & Miscellaneous Plastics 
Products 24 0.72 0.71 0.35 0.40 
33 Primary Metal Industries 31 0.67 0.70 0.37 0.37 
34 Fabricated Metal Products 31 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.46 
35 Industrial Machinery & Equipment 31 0.65 0.66 0.39 0.39 
36 Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 32 0.70 0.67 0.35 0.33 
37 Transportation Equipment 31 0.60 0.66 0.52 0.58 
38 Instruments & Related Products 32 0.73 0.75 0.33 0.28 
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 22 0.69 0.70 0.37 0.41 
48 Communications 31 0.62 0.64 0.24 0.19 
49 Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services 31 0.68 0.62 0.34 0.32 
50 Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 31 0.69 0.66 0.37 0.31 
51 Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods 31 0.77 0.68 0.45 0.36 
56 Apparel & Accessory Stores 21 0.87 0.87 0.96 0.75 
58 Eating & Drinking Places 31 0.74 0.72 0.44 0.55 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 27 0.76 0.80 0.37 0.39 
60 Depository Institutions 31 0.67 0.80 0.41 0.36 
62 Security & Commodity Brokers 25 0.64 0.71 0.45 0.37 
63 Insurance Carriers 31 0.68 0.70 0.33 0.27 
73 Business Services 32 0.66 0.65 0.38 0.39 
80 Health Services 26 0.71 0.67 0.43 0.49 
87 Engineering & Management Services 30 0.80 0.80 0.20 0.22 
 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 2 
Correlations 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) PERSIST  -0.070 0.016 -0.118 -0.032 
(2) TRANS -0.068  -0.079 -0.142 0.024 
(3) INTANGINTENSITY 0.004 -0.014  0.048 -0.087 
(4) CAPINTENSITY -0.085 -0.117 0.239  0.054 
(5) HERF -0.018 0.085 0.059 -0.014  
 
Pearson (Spearman) correlations are above (below) the diagonal. Correlations in bold are 
significant at the 10% level. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 3 
Test of H1: Association between Transparency and Persistence 
 
Panel A:  Summary of time-series regressions for 27 industries 
Dependent Variable: PERSISTt+1 
VarName mean t-stat p-value  median signed rank test p-value 
Intercept 0.743 41.709 <.01  0.743 189 <.01 
TRANSt -0.086 -3.410 <.01  -0.093 -136 <.01 
N per industry 28.852    31.000   
_RSQ_ 5.27%    3.66%   
 
Panel B: Summary of 32 cross-sectional regressions 
Dependent Variable: PERSISTt+1 
VarName mean t-stat p-value  median signed rank test p-value 
Intercept 0.775 22.41 <.01  0.755 264 <.01 
TRANSt -0.077 -2.99 <.01  -0.035 -128 0.01 
INTANGINTENSITYt -0.203 -0.50 0.62  0.413 13 0.81 
CAPINTENSITYt -0.604 -1.94 0.06  -0.779 -143 <.01 
HERFt -0.091 -0.46 0.65  0.008 -3 0.95 
N per year 27.875    28.500   
_RSQ_ 20.91%    16.66%   
 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 4 
Test of Differential ROA Growth for firms with initial ROA that is above (below) the industry median 
 
Panel A: Summary of time-series regressions for 27 industries 
Dependent Variable: PERSISTt+1 
VarName Mean t-stat p-value  median signed rank test p-value 
        
ROA lower than median        
Intercept 0.0018 0.93 0.36  0.0006 35 0.41 
TRANS 0.0180 3.35 <.01  0.0107 140 <.01 
N 28.852    31.000   
_RSQ_ 5.96%    2.76%   
        
ROA higher than median        
Intercept -0.026 -9.81 <.01  -0.027 -189 <.01 
TRANS 0.007 2.43 0.02  0.003 74 0.07 
N 28.852    31.000   
_RSQ_ 5.15%    2.54%   
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TABLE 4 continued 
Panel B: Summary of 32 cross-sectional regressions 
Dependent Variable: PERSISTt+1 
VarName mean t-stat p-value  median signed rank test p-value 
ROA lower than industry median        
Intercept -0.003 -0.93 0.36  -0.002 -39 0.47 
TRANS 0.009 2.84 <.01  0.010 150 <.01 
INTANGINTENSITY 0.252 2.92 <.01  0.155 204 <.01 
CAPINTENSITY -0.116 -0.72 0.47  0.069 18 0.74 
HERF 0.039 1.46 0.16  0.002 56 0.28 
N 27.875    28.500   
_RSQ_ 30.53%    28.72%   
        
ROA higher than industry median               
Intercept -0.007 -3.29 <.01  -0.005 -172 <.01 
TRANS 0.004 1.71 0.1  0.002 76 0.16 
INTANGINTENSITY -0.194 -6.96 <.01  -0.198 -235 <.01 
CAPINTENSITY -0.196 -3.59 <.01  -0.069 -229 <.01 
HERF -0.038 -2.45 0.02  -0.032 -146 <.01 
N 27.875    28.500   
_RSQ_ 39.72%    39.12%   
 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 5 
Test of Association between Transparency and Persistence of ROA Components 
Panel A:  Summary of time-series regressions for 27 industries 
Dependent Variable: PERSIST_MARGINt+1 
VarName mean t-stat p-value  Median signed rank test p-value 
Intercept 0.760 35.86 <.01  0.732 189 <.01 
TRANS -0.108 -2.91 <.01  -0.111 -105 <.01 
N 28.852    31.000   
_RSQ_ 5.73%    2.99%   
        
Dependent Variable: PERSIST_TURNt+1 
VarName mean t-stat p-value  median signed rank test p-value 
Intercept 0.899 86.53 <.01  0.902 189 <.01 
TRANS 0.002 0.158 0.88  0.010 12 0.78 
N 28.852    31.000   
_RSQ_ 2.88%    2.38%   
 
  
40 
 
TABLE 5 continued 
Panel B: Summary of 32 cross-sectional regressions 
 Dependent Variable: PERSIST_MARGINt+1 
VarName mean t-stat p-value  median signed rank test p-value 
Intercept 0.817 17.95 <.01  0.802 264 <.01 
TRANS -0.097 -2.17 0.04  -0.086 -120 0.02 
INTANGINTENSITY -1.180 -1.70 0.1  -0.473 -93 0.08 
CAPINTENSITY -0.320 -0.37 0.71  -0.871 -134 <.01 
HERF -0.028 -0.11 0.92  0.022 5 0.92 
N 27.875    28.500   
_RSQ_ 19.08%    14.98%   
 
Dependent Variable: PERSIST_TURNt+1 
VarName mean t-stat p-value  median signed rank test p-value 
Intercept 0.946 53.69 <.01  0.950 264 <.01 
TRANS -0.021 -1.59 0.12  -0.038 -81 0.13 
INTANGINTENSITY -0.307 -0.86 0.4  -0.577 -179 <.01 
CAPINTENSITY -0.883 -1.46 0.15  -0.292 -95 0.08 
HERF 0.040 0.36 0.72  0.004 22 0.67 
N 27.875    28.500   
_RSQ_ 27.24%    22.82%   
 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 6 
Test of Differential ROA Growth for firms with initial ROA that is above (below) the 
industry median 
 
Panel A: Summary of time-series regressions for 27 industries 
Dependent Variable: PERSIST_MARGINt+1 
Margin Below Industry Median 
VarName mean t-stat p-value  median signed rank test p-value 
Intercept 0.004 0.97 0.34  0.002 7 0.87 
TRANS 0.037 2.34 0.03  0.013 158 <.01 
N 28.852    31.000   
_RSQ_ 5.57%    3.01%   
        
Margin Above Industry Median 
VarName mean t-stat p-value  Median signed rank test p-value 
Intercept -0.028 -6.20 <.01  -0.021 -189 <.01 
TRANS 0.011 2.05 0.05  0.002 65 0.12 
N 28.852    31.000   
_RSQ_ 3.90%    2.08%   
 
Dependent Variable: PERSIST_TURNt+1 
Turnover Below Industry Median  
VarName mean t-stat p-value  median signed rank test p-value 
Intercept 0.017 5.04 <.01  0.014 157 <.01 
TRANS 0.009 1.08 0.29  0.002 29 0.50 
N 28.852    31.000   
_RSQ_ 5.91%    3.95%   
        
Turnover Above Industry Median  
VarName mean t-stat p-value  Median signed rank test p-value 
Intercept -0.067 -7.74 <.01  -0.057 -186 <.01 
TRANS 0.016 1.27 0.22  -0.005 19 0.66 
N 28.852    31.000   
_RSQ_ 5.05%    2.41%   
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TABLE 6 continued 
Panel B: Summary of 32 cross-sectional regressions 
Dependent Variable: PERSIST_MARGINt+1 
Margin Below Industry Median 
VarName mean t-stat p-value  median signed rank test p-value 
Intercept -0.012 -1.68 0.1  -0.015 -113 0.03 
TRANS 0.014 2.20 0.04  0.008 105 0.05 
INTANGINTENSITY 0.453 2.76 <.01  0.286 161 <.01 
CAPINTENSITY -0.097 -0.28 0.78  0.247 67 0.22 
HERF 0.064 1.13 0.27  0.062 84 0.1 
N 27.875    28.500   
_RSQ_ 39%    38%   
        
Margin Above Industry Median 
VarName mean t-stat p-value  median signed rank test p-value 
Intercept -0.003 -0.97 0.34  -0.005 -66 0.22 
TRANS 0.010 2.42 0.02  0.004 105 0.05 
INTANGINTENSITY -0.142 -3.52 <.01  -0.164 -171 <.01 
CAPINTENSITY -0.411 -5.50 <.01  -0.225 -253 <.01 
HERF -0.061 -2.71 0.01  -0.042 -152 <.01 
N 27.875    28.500   
_RSQ_ 41%    39%   
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TABLE 6 continued 
Panel B continued: 
Dependent Variable: PERSIST_TURNt+1 
Turnover Below Industry Median  
VarName mean t-stat p-value  median signed rank test p-value 
Intercept 0.010 1.87 0.07  0.007 120 0.02 
TRANS 0.002 0.44 0.66  0.001 29 0.6 
INTANGINTENSITY 0.123 1.12 0.27  0.242 137 <.01 
CAPINTENSITY 0.062 0.50 0.62  -0.017 -54 0.32 
HERF 0.053 1.86 0.07  0.062 116 0.02 
N 27.875    28.500   
_RSQ_ 21%    14%   
        
Turnover Above Industry Median  
VarName mean t-stat p-value  median signed rank test p-value 
Intercept -0.044 -5.14 <.01  -0.028 -256 <.01 
TRANS -0.009 -0.86 0.4  0.000 -46 0.4 
INTANGINTENSITY -0.285 -2.86 <.01  -0.278 -133 0.01 
CAPINTENSITY -0.007 -0.06 0.95  0.192 58 0.29 
HERF 0.009 0.14 0.89  -0.036 -12 0.82 
N 27.875    28.500   
_RSQ_ 24%    20%   
 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 7 
Additional Analysis: Association between Transparency and the Sensitivity of Entry and Exit to Anticipated Changes in 
Industry Profitability 
 
  Dependent Variable: NETENTRYt+1 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
ΔFUTUREINDROA 0.203*** 0.165*** 0.199*** 0.135*** 0.318*** 0.345*** 
 (3.891) (3.366) (3.850) (2.853) (3.217) (4.538) 
ΔFUTUREINDROA×TRANSi,t 0.213** 0.159** 0.214** 0.191*** 0.197** 0.153** 
 (2.373) (2.290) (2.417) (2.844) (2.202) (2.293) 
ΔFUTUREINDROA×INTANGINTENSITY     -0.578 0.009 
     (-0.521) (0.011) 
ΔFUTUREINDROA×CAPINTENSITY     -1.236 -2.647*** 
     (-0.990) (-2.688) 
ΔFUTUREINDROA×HERF     -0.339 -0.587 
     (-0.443) (-1.026) 
TRANSi,t -0.110** -0.079** -0.114*** -0.093*** -0.105** -0.075** 
 (-2.582) (-2.397) (-2.690) (-2.901) (-2.476) (-2.387) 
INTANGINTENSITY   -0.096 0.182 0.166 0.168 
   (-0.809) (0.442) (0.313) (0.319) 
CAPINTENSITY   -0.435*** -1.718*** 0.146 -0.851* 
   (-2.631) (-4.730) (0.241) (-1.710) 
HERF   0.204** -0.110 0.364 0.054 
   (2.353) (-0.615) (1.001) (0.157) 
Constant -0.100*** -0.026 -0.093*** 0.229*** -0.147*** 0.200** 
 (-4.121) (-0.833) (-3.605) (2.925) (-3.167) (2.447) 
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Observations 321 321 321 321 321 321 
R-squared 0.166 0.630 0.198 0.661 0.204 0.680 
Adjusted R-squared 0.159 0.563 0.183 0.595 0.181 0.613 
Industry FE  YES  YES  YES 
Year FE   YES   YES   YES 
t-statistics in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
See Appendix A for variable definitions.       
 
 
